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 Abstract 
The physician-patient-relationship: the patient’s view 
The importance of the physician-patient relationship for the health care market is beyond 
controversy. Most theoretical work is done in a principal-agent framework, dealing with 
moral hazard problems. Recent work emphasizes a two-sided asymmetric information rela-
tionship between physician and patient (double moral hazard). In contrast to most work look-
ing only at the physician's perspectives, our paper concentrates on the patient's view. Estima-
tion results using panel data support the hypotheses that physician consultation and health-
relevant behavior are not stochastically independent. This means that health care demand is 
determined by the patient and not only by the physician. In the recursive bivariate probit 
model, the patient’s health-relevant behavior has a significant positive influence on the 
probability of a physician visit. This should be taken into account in the discussion that 
primary care physicians should function as gatekeepers. 
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 1   Introduction 
In the political discussion about reforming the health care sector in Germany and especially 
the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) the focus is on health expenditures and financing health 
care. In detail, this corresponds to questions concerning the dynamics of expenditures and the 
slackness of revenues. Proposals that focus on the relationship between physician and patient 
play an underpart in the debate about the future design of the health care system. In the last 
years, regulation has taken place in the benefits catalogue and levels of coinsurance but not in 
the physician-patient relationship. In contrast to health politics, the advisory council for the 
health care system has described the fields of patient’s personal responsibility (cf. Sachver-
ständigenrat für die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen (1994)). In fact, the responsi-
bility is often misconceived as financial participation of the patient on his health care expen-
ditures. 
The patient’s special attitude in his relation to the physician can be described by the keyword 
patient orientation (cf. Sachverständigenrat für die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen 
(2003), 38). Compared to other parts of the service sector the health care sector has some 
characteristics that prevent a better patient orientation (cf. Sachverständigenrat für die 
Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen (2003), p. 182). On the one hand, 99 % of the pa-
tients demand for medical services is based on their status as an insured person. Therefore, it 
is not possible to speak of free consumption because of the regulations in this market.
1 On the 
other hand, asymmetric information is prevalent in the physician-patient relationship (cf. 
Wille / Ulrich (1991)). Moreover, the medical services can be classified as experience goods, 
so that the patient’s function in the health production is one of a “co-producer of health care” 
(Sachverständigenrat für die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen (2003), p. 182).
 2
From a theoretical point of view, patient’s influence in the physician-patient relationship can 
be analyzed from the perspective of economics of information. Most of the theoretical models 
in this field are based on the physician’s behavior whereas the patient’s health related be-
havior is neglected. Our paper emphasizes the patient’s view of the physician-patient 
relationship. Therefore, we focus on models that incorporate explicitly the patient’s health 
                                                 
1 The German Council of Economic Experts (cf. Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der ge-
samtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2002), p. 273) describes the relationship between physician and patient as a 
double rationality trap because it is individually rational for the patients to demand health care services inde-
pendently of the related costs. This emerges because of the compulsory contribution rates to the SHI. On the 
physician’s side a fee-for-service remuneration has an incentive to increase the quantity of services.  
2 In many cases, the services supplied can be denoted as confidence goods because the patient is not able to 
monitor their quality ex post. 
  1related behavior. It is important to keep in mind that the term health related behavior has a 
broader meaning than the term compliance, which indicates the patient’s complimentary 
treatment behavior. 
Part of the patient’s health relevant behavior is his consumption pattern, sports, or patient’s 
subjective measure of his health status. From an empirical perspective, especially the analysis 
of the determinants of patient’s behavior as well as the determination of factors influencing 
the relationship of a patient and his physician are in the center of interest. 
The paper is organized as follows: The second chapter presents some theoretical models of 
the physician-patient relationship that deal explicitly with the patient’s behavior. With the 
results of these models in mind testable hypotheses about patient’s behavior are developed. 
The empirical analysis is presented in the third part of the paper. The determinants of indi-
vidual health relevant behavior and physician consultation are investigated using a bivariate 
probit model for panel data. The paper ends with a conclusion.  
2  The relationship between physician and patient and the market for 
health care services 
The physician-patient relationship in the market for health care services is characterized by 
the following stylized facts. In contrast to other economic markets, asymmetric information is 
prevalent in the health care sector. Especially the patient suffers an informational disadvan-
tage and there is a lack of consumer sovereignty (cf. Ryan (1994) and Gaynor (1994)). The 
quality of the credence good medical services is not verifiable for the patient neither before 
medical treatment nor after (cf. Arrow (1963), p. 949 and Richard (1996), p. 201).
3 This ap-
plies to the situation whether the patient is not informed about the medical process. Therefore, 
he cannot infer the adequate therapy from the disease symptoms (cf. Richard (1993), p. 2). 
Like in other service industries, production and consumption of the good are not separable 
(uno-actu principle). Moreover, as the physician usually does diagnosis and therapy, he has a 
discretionary scope concerning his decisions (cf. Arrow (1963), p. 949). As a result, it is pos-
sible that the physician is able to use medical services and his therapeutic advice to maximize 
his resulting profit (cf. Gaynor (1994), p. 299ff. and Richard (1993), p. 2).  
The physician’s scope for profit maximizing activities depends crucially on the remuneration 
system and the possibility of a kind of treatment monopoly even if this is temporary limited 
                                                 
3 For a theoretical analysis about credence goods cf. Emons (1997). 
  2(cf. Kortendieck (1993), p. 186). The treatment success is not solely determined by physi-
cian’s actions but is also influenced by the patient’s treatment accompanying behavior, his 
compliance because in most cases the treatment would not result in a satisfactory outcome 
without patient’s cooperation (cf. Wille / Ulrich (1991), p. 27ff.). From the perspective of the 
economics of information, there exists mutual asymmetric information between physician and 
patient. The physician provides the medical services that he is going to demand due to his 
informational advantage over the patient. The latter is the source of the original demand but at 
the same time is a productive input and therefore an integral component of the supply side. 
Thus, health outcome can be described as joint production between physician’s medical ser-
vices and patient’s behavior (cf. Wille / Ulrich (1991), 27). Consequently, each actor has a 
discretionary scope concerning the actions he can make use of for his own advantage (cf. 
Wille / Ulrich (1991), 27).
4
The adequate theoretical background for investigating the information relation between phy-
sician and patient is the so-called principal-agent theory (cf. Arrow (1985) and Zweifel 
(1994)).
5 By means of his specialized knowledge, the physician gains advantages he can use 
to influence the patient’s demand. This informational advantage goes hand in hand with in-
centives to control the treatment the patient is going to choose in order to receive the maxi-
mum net revenue (cf. Evans (1974), p. 163). It is possible to manipulate the demand by vary-
ing the contact frequency, treatment intensity, and treatment costs (cf. Kortendieck (1993), 
p. 234). The physician acts in two matters: first as the provider of medical services and second 
as the patient’s advisor concerning the decision about demanded services (cf. Breyer / Zweifel 
/ Kifmann (2005)). 
Most of the principal-agent models in health economics focus solely on the physician’s be-
havior. Some newer approaches explicitly integrate the health relevant behavior of the patient 
and its influence on physician activities and health outcome into the analysis (cf. Ma / 
McGuire (1997), Leonard / Zivin (2001) and Schneider (2004)). Core of the following analy-
sis is the so-called double moral hazard approach that is fundamental to the model of 
Schneider (2002a). The basic structure of the model is presented in Figure 1. 
                                                 
4 Moreover, there exists uncertainty in the market for medical service concerning the demand as well as on the 
supply side. „Patients are uncertain about their condition, the accuracy of the physician’s diagnosis, his honesty, 
and the amount of effort or quality he has expected on their case. [...] Physicians do not know the patient’s 
condition, they are uncertain about the technology of proceeding health from health care, and they do not (gener-
ally) know the patient’s reservation price“ (Gaynor (1994), p. 225). 
5 An agency relationship is illustrated by preferences of principal and agent that fall apart and the informational 
advantage of the agent (cf. Gaynor (1994)). Besides the physician-patient relationship, there exist other princi-
pal-agent relations in the health care sector, e. g. between insurer and physician or between patient and insurer 
(cf. Pfaff / Zweifel (1998)). 
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Source: Cf. Schneider (2002a), p. 107. 
The model incorporates a contract and a treatment stage. At the first stage, the insurer signs 
the insurance contract with the patient and the remuneration contract with the physician or the 
physicians association. It is worth mentioning that these contracts are dependent from the in-
surer’s point of view. After contracting, nature decides about the health status of the patient. If 
he is ill he visits the physician (contact decision); in the other case, the game ends. The physi-
cian plays the central part at the treatment stage. He chooses the adequate therapy that de-
pends on patient’s health status as well as on the remuneration, coinsurance, and insurance 
premium. Moreover, the health outcome is also determined by the patient’s health related 
behavior.  
One central element of the treatment stage of the model is the strategically interaction of phy-
sician’s medical services and patient’s compliance. In detail, one has to distinguish three 
cases of interaction: first, medical services and compliance are strategic independent. This 
means that a higher level of medical services has no effect on the marginal productivity of the 
compliance and vice versa. Second, in the case of strategic complements the marginal pro-
ductivity of one input factor in the medical process increases as the level of the other factor 
rises. Third, given strategic substitutes, a decrease of the marginal productivity of one input is 
the result of an increase in the other input. As a consequence, the probability of a recovery 
depends not only on the level of medical services and compliance but also on the kind of 
strategic interaction. Furthermore, when introducing a demand-side coinsurance, health out-
come depends crucially on the strategic interactions. 
Within this model structure, it is possible to analyze the determinants of physician visits and 
the health relevant behavior of the patient. It is important to note that the results of the treat-
ment stage cannot be adopted straightforwardly for an empirical model. First, it is necessary 
  4to look at the entire health production process i.e. that besides the compliance of the patient 
his health relevant behavior without a physician visit is important, too. The second point cor-
responds to the first. The contracts for health insurance have an influence on the behavior of 
physician and patient especially if we look at a demand-side coinsurance that influences the 
contact decision. It follows that it seems necessary to extent the analysis to the entire health 
production instead of focusing on the treatment process. 
3  Empirical analysis of the physician-patient relationship 
3.1  Basic considerations 
The following hypotheses that depend on the structure of information between physician and 
patient are used as starting point for the empirical analysis. First, the decision whether a dis-
comfort can be regarded as an illness or not depends on each person’s own discretionary 
power (hypothesis 1).
6 The more liberally the choice of the physician is organized and the 
lower the costs the patient has to bear the higher is the probability of a consultation of the 
physician even in the case of a small discomfort. Second, in case of a consultation, the physi-
cian determines not only the illness diagnosis but also because of his medical knowledge the 
relevant therapy and therefore the patient’s demand for medical services (hypothesis 2).
7 The 
tendency for a supply-side increase of the treatment frequency intensifies by a fee-for-service 
remuneration system. Third, this excessive supply behavior facilitates because the possibility 
to control the supplied medical services as well as the treatment quality is limited (hypothesis 
3). Fourth, the excessive demand behavior of the patient benefits from the lack of cost trans-
parency concerning the level and the distribution of the treatment costs (hypothesis 4). Fifth, 
the non-constrained and non-coordinated choice of the physician leads to duplicate or mul-
tiple examinations and results in a rise in health care expenditure because of not coordinated 
parallel treatments (hypothesis 5). 
One remaining question for the empirical analysis is the measurement of health relevant be-
havior and medical services. Both variables are multidimensional constructs. Therefore, it is 
necessary to develop appropriate indicators for the empirical analysis because both, health 
relevant behavior and medical services are difficult to measure. Concerning the medical ser-
vices, the treatment expenditures or the number of physician visits are possible indicators. For 
                                                 
6 More than 18 % of ambulatory patients indicated that their discomforts that let them visit the physician were 
only of minor importance. The treating physicians argued that 30 % of the discomforts could be regarded as 
negligible (cf. Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2000), p. 252). 
7 The structure of the decision process can be empirically tested by separating the contact from the frequency 
decision (cf. Pohlmeier / Ulrich (1995), Jones (2000)). 
  5the health relevant behavior, the situation is more complex. We construct an indicator that 
may include patient’s attitude towards health, his consumption behavior, or sports.  
Besides these aspects that deal with the topic of choosing variables the choice of the estima-
tion method is of relevance. Here, it is necessary to decide if the actions of physician and pa-
tient occur simultaneously or sequentially. This distinction is important if the sequence of 
actions has an impact on the result. If the health outcome does not depend on the timing 
structure or if it is not possible to sort the data with respect to the sequence of actions the si-
multaneous structure fits better. Moreover, besides this simultaneity it is necessary for the 
estimation method to account for the interdependency of the actions of physician and patient. 
3.2  Data 
The data we use are three waves from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), 
the years 1998, 1999, and 2001.
8 Together with these data, we use the physician density in 
each of the German states. Our variables of interest are the health relevant behavior of the 
patient and the physician’s medical services. 
Patient’s health relevant behavior is a multidimensional variable that is problematic to ob-
serve directly. It is therefore necessary to construct an adequate indicator that covers various 
aspects of the health relevant behavior. Two different kinds of aspects are of relevance: on the 
one hand direct patterns of individual behavior and on the other hand health perception.
9 
First, the direct behavioral patterns are consumption and sports. Second, health perception 
includes the subjective perception of the patient’s health status. While the relevance of a 
harmful consumption for the health status is clear it is possible for the sports to identify two 
effects that point in the opposite direction. First, the individual health status might improve 
due to sports and second, there exist a higher risk of injuries. Especially because of the second 
possibility, we reject the option of including the sports variable in the index of health relevant 
behavior.  
With respect to the health relevant consumption only data about tobacco consumption are 
included in the SOEP. For the year 1998 it is asked if the respondent smoked cigarettes, cigars 
                                                 
8 The data used in this publication were made available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. For the year 2000 no information about 
tobacco consumption is available. 
9 A principle components analysis is used for the determination of the influencing factors of the health care be-
haviour including variables referring to health like smoking and sports. The result of this analysis is that for all 
variables high loadings are found at least for one of the principle components. Therefore, besides the statistical 
techniques also economic and socio-scientific criteria are used for the choice of variables describing the health 
relevant behaviour.  
  6or a pipe or if he is a non-smoker. In contrast to this, for the years 1999 and 2001 it is gener-
ally requested if the respondent smokes or not. Therefore, we transform the 1998 data to use a 
binary variable (smoker yes-no) in analogy to the years 1999 and 2001. Other consumption 
patterns like alcohol drinking and consumption expenditures are not included in the question-
naire. Instead, many variables concerned with the subjective perception of the respondent 
towards his health status are included in the data, e.g. the satisfaction with health, the current 
state of health, the importance of health, and worries about health. Unfortunately, only the 
first two variables are available for all waves in our dataset. For the indicator of health rele-
vant behavior, we use tobacco consumption and satisfaction with health. The latter is a vari-
able is a subjective appreciation of the health status consisting of eleven categories, scaled 
from poor health (zero) to healthy (ten). Our indicator will take the value one (high health 
relevant behavior) if he does not smoke and if the variable satisfaction with health takes the 
value seven or higher. 
The second endogenous variable is medical services. This variable is not included in the 
SOEP dataset. Only some indicators for the utilization of health services are available, e.g. the 
number of physician visits in the last quarter, the number of overnight stays in hospital or the 
number of rehabilitations, both in the last year. Because these two variables are date back too 
far and the number of rehabilitations is not available for the wave 2001, we use the number of 
physician visits in the current year.
10 In analogy to the indicator of the health relevant be-
havior it is possible to create a binary variable that takes the value one if there was one or 
more physician visit in the last quarter. Moreover, the independent variables are predisposing 
variables like age, age squared, gender, nationality, family status, and an interaction term. For 
the latter, age is multiplied with the dummy variable gender. The group of socioeconomic 
variables consists of income and educational variables, a variable concerning the unemploy-
ment status as well as the respondent’s sporting and religious activities. Furthermore, we in-
clude health and insurance variables like hospital stay in the previous year, physician density 
per state, a measure of health, and the insurance status. An overview over the variables in the 
dataset is given in Table 1. 
                                                 
10 This variable does not make any distinction between treatment and prevention. 
  7Table 1: Description of variables in the dataset 
dependent variables 
physician  physician visit in the last quarter yes/no 
health behavior  non-smoker and current health status at least good yes/no 
predisposing variables 
age  age in years 
age² age  squared 
gender  1 = female, 0 = male 
interaction age*gender 
single  not living together with a partner yes/no 
foreign  nationality not German yes/no 
socioeconomic variables 
unemployed unemployed  yes/no 
Eastern Germany  living in Eastern Germany yes/no 
income  household net income per month in 1000 DM 
university  university degree yes/no 
high school  general qualification for university entrance yes/no 
O-level  first public examination in secondary school yes/no 
religious  go to church every week yes/no 
sports  go in for sports every week yes/no 
health and insurance variables 
hospital hospital  stay  in last year yes/no 
health status  health status 1= very good, … , 5= bad  
physician density  physicians per 10.000 inhabitants per state 
supplemental insurance  private supplemental insurance yes/no 
private health insurance  fully private insured yes/no 
 
3.3  Estimation techniques 
Because of the simultaneity of health relevant behavior and medical services in the double 
moral hazard approach presented in chapter 2 we use an empirical model for simultaneous 
equations. The advantage of this procedure is that we are able to estimate two equations that 
seem to be independent at first view. Instead, there exists a correlation between them due to 
the structure of the errors. 
Starting with the dependent variables, we are in need of an estimation technique for qualita-
tive dependent variables.
11 Two estimation techniques are of special interest for the underly-
ing theoretical model. First, a bivariate probit model and second, a bivariate probit model with 
recursive effect (cf. Maddala (1983) or Greene (2003)).
12 To start with the simple bivariate 
                                                 
11 In contrast to the work of Schellhorn (2004) who uses a count data model combined with an instrumental 
variables approach, we emphasize the simultaneity with our proceeding. Moreover, we are not interested in the 
dependency of the error term upon the independent variables but in the correlation between the two equations 
due to the error terms. 
12 There exist other models using a binary dependent variable for the first equation and a continuous dependent 
variable for the second equation (cf. Maddala (1983)). Our indicator for the utilization of health care, the number 
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Here, the parameter ρ is the covariance between the error terms.
14 Both equations in (3.1) can 
be estimated separately as single probit models but the estimated coefficients are inefficient 
because the correlation between the error terms is neglected. Only in the case where the co-
variance parameter ρ is not significantly different from zero it is possible to deal with the 
above model as two independent equations. 





















In equation (3.2), φ2 denotes the density of the bivariate normal distribution. To derive the 
log-likelihood function it is necessary to define qi1=2yi1-1 and qi2=2yi2-1. The variable takes 
the value 1 if yij=1 holds and the value -1 for yij=0, for j=1, 2. Furthermore, we assume that 
zij=x’ijβj and wij=qijzij, for j=1, 2 and ρi*=qi1qi2ρ. The probabilities that enter the log-likelihood 





























                                                                                                                                                          
of physician visits, is a count variable. Applying the estimation method described can result in inefficient, incon-
sistent, and biased estimates (cf. Long (1997), p. 217). 
13 A model in which the vector of explaining variables is different in both equations can be characterized as a 
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model (cf. StataCorp (2001), p. 139). 
14 The estimation is carried out using maximum likelihood techniques. 
  9 
The second estimation approach considers a potential endogeneity of the dependent variables. 
If one emanates from a mutual influence of both dependent variables the structural equations 
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Here, y1 and y2 are binary dependent variables. Equation (3.6) gives the probability if both 
variables take the value one. The probabilities for the other cases are calculated in the same 
manner. Again, Φ2 is the bivariate normal conditional distribution function. Unfortunately, the 
above model is not consistent and not estimable in the presented form. One possible modifi-
cation of the approach is to calculate the probabilities for two binary dependent variables if 



















The equations in (3.7) form a recursive, simultaneous equation system (cf. Maddala (1983)). 
The problem of endogeneity in the first equation is not relevant for the calculation of the log-
likelihood function. Therefore, in contrast to a linear regression model, the simultaneity can 
be neglected (cf. Greene (2003), p. 715). 
With respect to the panel structure of the data, the above model has to be adjusted. We use the 
random parameters approach suggested in Greene (2001) to implement a random effects 
                                                 
15 There exist different alternatives of the dependent variables for the presented model, e.g. latent, observed or 
censored Variables. Maddala suggests a two-step estimation procedure (cf. Maddala (1983), p. 243). 
  10bivariate probit model for panel data.
16 The basic structure of a random parameters model for 






⎠ Prob yit = 1 |xit ,β i =F β
'




with F(·) as the normal distribution. In the general model, it is assumed that parameters are 
randomly distributed with possible heterogeneous mean across individuals. Moreover, the 
mean and the variance for the coefficients βi are: 
E β i |zi =β +Δ zi ,
 
 
Var β i |zi = ∑ .  
 
 
The underlying specification of the coefficients vector is: 




where β is the vector of unconditional means. Furthermore, Δ is a matrix of unknown location 
parameters, zi is a vector of individual characteristics (heterogeneity term), Γ a matrix of un-
known variance parameters and vi the vector of random latent individual effects, with a mean 
of zero. If the mean of the coefficient βi is constant, the parameter in view is non-random. In 
our estimation of a bivariate probit model, we assume that all parameters are non-random 
except for the constant terms in both equations.
17 In this formulation, the random parameters 



























it is the binary dependent variable of equation j. The vector β
 j is the coefficient vector 
that is constant over individuals and time. The heterogeneity between individuals is repre-
sented by the parameter α
 j
i that is random over individuals and ε
 j




i are binormally distributed with a zero mean and a standard deviation equal 
to σαj and the correlation coefficient is θ. For the true error terms, the same assumptions are 
                                                 
16 For an application of a random parameters approach see Greene (2002), Greene (2004) and Björnsen (2004). 
17 This means that the parameter matrix Δ=0. 
18 The recursive effect of y
 1 and y
 2 in the second equation of (3.9) is neglected here. 
  11made as in equation (3.1): the standard deviation is equal to 1 and the covariance or correla-
tion between these error terms is ρ. Moreover, there exists no correlation between the true 
errors and the individual heterogeneity parameters. The estimation is carried out using 
LIMDEP Version 8.0. For the random effects bivariate probit model, we use the random pa-
rameter specification with only constant terms as random.
19  
3.4  Estimation results 
First, if one takes a look at the descriptive statistics of the data used it is obvious that 59.5 % 
of the respondents have visited their physician in the last quarter on average (cf. Table 2). 
Overall, the dataset consists of 7856 individuals for three years (23568 observations). 39.1 % 
of the individuals claim to have a good health related behavior. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (n=7856, T=3, N=23568) 
dependent variables   mean  standard deviation 
physician 0,595  0,491 
health behavior  0.391  0.488 
predisposing variables   
age 45,428  16,264 
age² 2328,197  1598,539 
gender 0,519  0,500 
interaction 23,764  25,867 
single 0,257  0,437 
foreign 0,127  0,329 
socioeconomic variables 
unemployed 0,073  0,260 
Eastern Germany  0,314  0,464 
income 4,072  2,277 
university 0,120  0,325 
high school  0,163  0,370 
O-level 0,234  0,424 
religious 0,090  0,286 
sports 0,254  0,435 
health and insurance variables   
hospital 0,121  0,326 
health status  2.611  0.922 
physician density  34,691  4,811 
supplemental insurance  0,059  0,235 
private health insurance  0,074  0,262 
 
The average age of the sample is 45.4 years whereas only adults are included in our dataset. 
Overall, 51.9 % are female, 26,8 % do not live together with a partner and 12.7 % are not 
                                                 
19 Moreover, instead of the random draws we use the Halton sequence for the simulated maximum likelihood to 
reduce the number of draws and the computation time. 
  12German. Concerning the socioeconomic variables, it is obvious that 7.3 % are unemployed at 
the time the survey was conducted. About 31 % have their living residence in Eastern Ger-
many (including the former East Berlin). The average net income of a household is about 
4000 DM. Regarding the education of the individuals, 12 % tell a university or comparable 
degree as their highest certificate, 16.3 % have a high-school graduation and 23.4 % a first 
public examination in secondary school. The remaining 48.7 % of the respondents possess 
another kind of certificate or they did not graduate from any kind of school. Only 9.0 % of our 
sample said that they frequently attend church and about 25 % carry out sports regularly. 
For the health and insurance variables, it follows that about 12 % of the respondents stayed at 
least once in hospital the year before. The measure of health status is a categorical indicator. 
If it takes the value 1 the individual assesses his health status as very good and if it takes the 
value 5 his health status is very poor. The average value for the health status is 2.6 and lies in 
the middle of the scale. The physician density in Germany in the years 1998, 1999, and 2001 
has an average of 34.7 that means that there are about 35 physicians per 10,000 residents. 
Only 7.4 % of the respondents in the sample are fully privately insured and only 5.9 % have a 
supplemental insurance. These low values correspond with the actual level in Germany. This 
is a result of the dominance of the Statutory Health Insurance with covers more than 90 % of 
the population. 
For the subsequent estimation results, there are 23568 observations available; the number of 
individuals is 7856 in a three-year panel. We only look at adults both employed and not 
working. For the two estimation equations for the health relevant behavior and the physician 
visits, we use different sets of independent variables. For both regressions, all of the predis-
posing variables are included. For the health behavior regression, all of the socioeconomic 
variables are integrated. Moreover, we include the subjective health status and the insurance 
variables in the first equation. 
In the estimation of the physician visit equation, the unemployment variable and the one con-
cerning sports are used. The unemployment serves as a measure for the opportunity costs of a 
physician visit. We do not include the household income because in a health care system like 
in Germany where over 90 % of the population is insured in the SHI with contribution rates as 
a share of earned income and low co-payments. Furthermore, we assume that for all other 
socioeconomic variables the effect on the probability of a physician visit is only indirect via 
the health relevant behavior.  
  13First, we estimate a bivariate probit model without a recursive effect as it is presented in sec-
tion 3.3. The results are obtainable from Table 3. In addition to the variables described, we 
introduced two yearly dummies for 1998 and 1999, which should measure the individual in-
variant effect over time. Both coefficients are negative but only that one for 1999 is signifi-
cant. This means that compared to the year 2001 in 1999 the probability for a good health 
related behavior was lower. In addition, it is obvious that the health relevant behavior depends 
negatively on the individual’s age. The effect is significant on the 1 % level. The quadratic 
age term is significant positive. Overall, it follows that we have a u-shaped relationship be-
tween health related behavior and age. If we look at the gender variable, the significant posi-
tive effect indicates that women’s health related behavior is better than that of men. The inter-
action variable is not significant. Therefore, it follows that the health related behavior reaches 
its minimum at about the age of 43 years independent of the gender of the respondent. For-
eigners and singles show a lower health related behavior. Possible explanations are that for 
the first group we observe different living habits and that for the second group there is no 
partner to monitor the behavior. 
The significant negative coefficient of the unemployment variable indicates that people with-
out a job have a lower probability for a good health related behavior independent of their fi-
nancial situation. Other socioeconomic factors show the expected signs and are significant on 
the 1 % level. People living in Eastern Germany have a minor health related behavior. The 
household income has a positive effect as well as a better education does.
20 All of the three 
education dummies show a positive effect with respect to the reference case, i.e. a lower 
school graduation certificate. An individual that goes to church every week exhibits a better 
health related behavior and the coefficient of the sport dummy also is positive. This means 
that the effect of a better health status dominates the adverse effect of a higher risk of injury. 
In the group of the health and insurance variables, the health status has a significant negative 
impact on the probability for a good health related behavior. Health status is a categorical 
variable with the value one indicating that the health status is very good. A higher value goes 
along with a poorer health status. In the first equation, a reduction of the health status leads to 
a worse health related behavior. One possible interpretation for this result is that people are ill 
and seek medical care from a physician, which can be seen through the significant positive 
coefficient for the health status in the estimation of a physician visit. The consumption of 
                                                 
20 This corresponds with the effect of the income in the Grossman model where a higher income leads to a higher 
consumption of medical services (cf. Grossman (1972), p. 243). 
  14medical services leads to a reduction in their own effort. This indicates that there exists a sub-
stitutive relation between medical services and health related behavior. A supplemental of full 
private insurance has no significant effect on the probability of a good health related behavior. 
Table 3: Estimation results bivariate probit model 
 health  behavior  physician 
  coefficient z-value coefficient z-value 
predisposing variables 
1998 -0.0093  -0.57*** 1.5013  46.81*** 
1999 -0.0428  -2.56***  0.2259  11.56*** 
age -0.0341  -12.31***  -0.1049  -26.86*** 
age² 0.0004  15.29***  0,0015  38.25*** 
gender 0.3075  7.45***  1.7109  28.67*** 
interaction -0.0012  -1.41*** -0.0152  -12.01*** 
single -0.2238  -12.06***  -0.2407  -9.68*** 
foreign -0.1768  -7.77***  -0.1932  -6.55*** 
socioeconomic variables 
unemployed -0.1745  -6.21***  0.0890  2.47*** 
Eastern Germany  -0.1420  -7.87***  -    -   
income 0.0379  11.51***  -    -   
university 0.2065  7.74***  -    -   
high school  0.2960  12.40***  -    -   
O-level 0.1286  6.73***  -    -   
religious 0.3473  14.03***  -    -   
sports 0.3411  21.12***  0.2142  9.79*** 
health and insurance variables 
hospital -    -    0.3640  11.58*** 
health status  -1.0311  -100.56***  0.7154  53.31*** 
physician density  -    -    0.0089  4.29*** 
supplemental insur-
ance 
-0.0308 -1.02***  0.1209 3.15*** 
private insured  -0.0012  -0.04*** -0.3304  -8.88*** 
mean for random pa-
rameter 
2.3361 31.95***  -1.3740  -11.28*** 
σα1 1.1854  
σα2 3.0226  
θ  0.0150  
ρ  -0.0760  Wald test ρ = 0 (Chi²) 47.84*** 
Log-Likelihood -
21122.91 
    
McFadden R²  0,1269       
McFadden R² adj  0,1254       
AIC 1.7955       
N  23568  n = 7856  T = 3   
        
***  significant at the 1-%-level 
**  significant at the 5-%-level 
*  significant at the 10-%-level 
 
  15If one looks at the equation for the physician visit, it is obvious that all predisposing variables 
show the same sign as in the first equation except the dummies for the year 1998 and 1999. 
They both have a significant positive impact, which means that compared to the year 2001 the 
probability of a physician visit was higher in these years. This may display the effect of sev-
eral health care reform acts introduced in the years 1998 to 2000 that aimed at cost contain-
ment in the SHI. The gender variable shows a strong significant positive effect but the coeffi-
cient for the interaction term is significantly negative. The latter implies that women demand 
less medical services with an increasing age. The probability for a physician visit reaches its 
minimum at the age of 35 years for men and 40 years for women. We observe the same u-
shaped connection between physician visit and age. One possible explanation is the co-mor-
bidity of older patients. Solitary persons have a lower probability to visit a physician. The 
same is true for foreigners although the coefficient for non-Germans is only significant at the 
10 % level. One explanation for the negative coefficient is a language problem for this popu-
lation group. 
The socioeconomic variables used in this estimation are unemployment and a dummy for 
sports. Both have a significant positive coefficient. The result for the unemployment variable 
supports the assumption of lower opportunity costs of time for this group. The positive sports 
effect can be interpreted on the one hand as higher health awareness and on the other hand as 
the result of more injuries. 
Considering the group of health and insurance variables one realizes that a hospital stay in the 
previous year leads to a higher probability of a physician visit in the current year. The reason 
for this may be aftercare or post-operative treatments. Moreover, a hospital stay may have its 
reason in chronic or severe illnesses. The health status has a significant and positive influence 
indicating that people with health problems seek medical care more likely than other people 
do. The variable physician density per state is positive and significant at the 5 % level. A 
better supply of medical services leads to a higher demand and goes along with the theory of 
supplier-induced demand. The insurance parameters show different results. A supplemental 
insurance increases the probability of a physician visit while it is reduced if the individual is 
fully private insured. An explanation for the first effect is that supplemental insurance en-
hances the benefits catalogue or reduces the coinsurance one has to pay. Therefore, medical 
services are relatively cheaper then. The lower demand of fully private insured individuals 
  16may have its cause in the existence of a co-payment for medical services that is higher than 
for standard SHI insured people.
21
The covariance parameter r has the value -0.076. A Chi² test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the parameter does not differ from zero. This result implies that the two equations are not in-
dependent and that two single probit estimates would have led to inefficient standard errors. 
From an economic perspective, this confirms us in the belief that the patient’s behavior can-
not be analyzed independent from the demand for medical services. The goodness-of-fit for 
the results can be proved by the use of several criteria: First, the McFadden pseudo-R² meas-
ure and second, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (cf. Long (1997)). Generally, the 
McFadden-R² is a kind of “likelihood-ratio index” (Long (1997), p. 104) that informs about 
the relation of the likelihood of the estimated model and the likelihood of the constant-only 
model. An unambiguous interpretation is only possible for the case of the McFadden-R² equal 
to zero because none of the estimated coefficients differs from zero. In contrast to this, the 
measure never reaches the value of one. Moreover, it is not possible to give a comprehensible 
interpretation for values between zero and one. Despite this, the measure is useful for com-
paring the goodness-of-fit of different models. The Akaike information criterion is based on 
the log-likelihood of the estimated model as well. It represents the trade-off between the 
goodness of the estimation, given via the log-likelihood and the parsimony of the specifica-
tion, which is given through the number of estimated parameters. The AIC is often used to 
compare different model specifications. That model which possesses the lowest value of the 
AIC is chosen as the best (cf. Verbeek (2000), p. 54 and 204). Given the results presented in 
Table 3, we have a value for the McFadden-R² of 0.1269, for the adjusted McFadden-R² of 
0.1254 and for the AIC of 1.7955. 
The second estimation is a bivariate probit model with recursive effect. In this case, one of the 
dependent variables acts as an explanatory variable in the other equation. First, one has to 
prove how the recursive effect looks like. On the one hand, the probability of a physician visit 
might influence the health related behavior; on the other hand, the reverse case is also possi-
ble. One argument against the first opportunity is that the causes of a physician visit lie in the 
individual actions of the patient and that the health related behavior expresses these individual 
actions. In contrast to this, it is not clear whether a physician consultation leads to changes in 
the individual behavior because the compliance of the patient also depends on the kind of 
                                                 
21 Another interpretation of this result is that the private insured individuals represent better risks compared to 
members of the SHI. 
  17illness, the kind of information of the patient, and his communication to his physician. On this 
account, we include the binary variable of patient’s health related behavior into the estimation 
of the probability of a physician visit. The results of this recursive bivariate probit are pre-
sented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Estimation results recursive, bivariate probit model 
 health  behavior  physician 
 coefficient  z-value  coefficient  z-value 
health behavior      0.1049  3.59*** 
predisposing variables 
1998 -0.0093  -0.58*** 1.4988  46.819*** 
1999 -0.0429  -2.57**  0.2266  11.61*** 
age -0.0341  -12.33***  -0.1043  -26.75*** 
age² 0.0004  15.29***  0.0015  38.12*** 
gender 0.3065  7.43***  1.7065  28.62*** 
interaction -0.0012  -1.37*** -0.0187  -12.05*** 
single -0.2237  -12.06***  -0.2356  -9.47*** 
foreign -0.1765  -7.76***  -0.1872  -6.35*** 
socioeconomic variables 
unemployed -0.1746  --6.21***  0.0916  2.55*** 
Eastern Germany  -0.1414  -7.85***  -    -   
income 0.0380  11.54***  -    -   
university 0.2070  7.77***  -    -   
high school  0.2965  12.43***  -    -   
O-level 0.1282  6.71***  -    -   
religious 0.3481  14.07***  -    -   
sports 0.3413  21.14***  0.2063  9.40*** 
health and insurance variables 
hospital -    -    0.3624  11.55*** 
health status  -1.030  -100.53***  0.7351  50.67*** 
physician density  -  -    0,0087  4.19*** 
supplemental insurance  -0.0314  -1.04*** 0,1208  3.15*** 
private insured  -0.0017  -0.06*** -0,3340  -8.98*** 
mean for random pa-
rameter 
2.3350 31.94***  -1.4653  -11.77*** 
σα1 1.1845    
σα2 3.0168    
θ  0.0449    
ρ  -0.1347  Wald-Test ρ = 0 (Chi²)  -129.34*** 
Log-Likelihood -21122.80       
McFadden R²  0.1269       
McFadden R² adj  0.1254       
AIC 1.7956       
N 23568  n=7856  T=3   
        
***  significant at the 1-%-level 
**  significant at the 5-%-level 
*  significant at the 10-%-level 
  18First, with respect to the physician equation, it is obvious that patient’s health related behavior 
has a significant positive impact on the probability of a physician visit. This means that the 
decision to contact a physician depends on the own association about health and how to it 
could be preserved. For persons who have a high valuation of health and who behave accord-
ing to this the probability of a visit is higher. In the dataset, there is no distinction made be-
tween illness-specific and preventive visits. Overall, from a theoretical perspective, this result 
strengthens the view that health related behavior and physician visits are complements (cf. 
Schneider (2004)).
22 For all other variables, we observe only slight changes in the coeffi-
cients’ values. The same is true for the significance levels: For the variable foreigner the coef-
ficient is now significant at the 5 %-level and for the variable private insured at the 1 %-level. 
The lowest probability for a physician visit is for men at the age of 35 and for women at the 
age of 41 years. 
The estimation of the health related behavior is robust and shows no difference to the bi-
variate probit without recursive effect. All estimated coefficients have the same sign as in 
Table 3 and the magnitude changes only slightly. Only the significance level of the dummy 
for 1999 deteriorates a little bit. If one looks at the age coefficients, it is clear that the compu-
tation of the age with the lowest probability of a good health related behavior gives the same 
results as in the first estimation. The covariance parameter r is also negative with a value of -
0.1347. Using the Chi² test, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no correlation be-
tween the equations. Again, this result strengthens our thesis that patient’s behavior and the 
demand for medical services are dependent decisions. With respect to the goodness-of-fit 
measures, only minor changes for the AIC are identifiable so that there is no clear evidence if 
one of the model specifications is to prefer. 
To conclude our findings, the health related behavior of the patient and the probability of a 
physician visit are dependent decision processes and the result of the recursive model gives 
incidence that the patient’s behavior has a positive impact on the demand for medical services 
(hypothesis 1 and 2). From a health politics perspective, the results obtained argue for a better 
preventive medicine. Moreover, it is necessary to integrate the patient in the medical process 
(hypothesis 4). Central elements are an improved communication and information structure 
(cf. Schneider (2002b)) as well as a better orientation of the physician on his position as a 
gatekeeper (hypothesis 3). In this context, the implementation of managed-care systems in 
                                                 
22 One has to keep in mind that in the theoretical model only the treatment situation and therefore the compliance  
is analyzed while the estimation covers all kinds of health related behavior of the patient.  
  19Germany may serve as one instrument to interconnect the health related behavior and the 
medical process (hypothesis 5). Generally, it is possible to use contractual arrangements to 
implement incentives for the patients for a better health related behavior but one has to keep 
in mind the interdependency between patient behavior, physician visit, and medical treatment. 
4  Conclusion 
The importance of the physician-patient relationship for the health care market is beyond 
controversy. Most theoretical work is done in a principal-agent framework, dealing with 
moral hazard problems. Recent work emphasizes a two-sided asymmetric information rela-
tionship between physician and patient (double moral hazard). In contrast to most work look-
ing only at the physician’s perspectives, our paper concentrates on the patient’s view. The 
paper aims at investigating the physician-patient relationship in a principal-agent framework. 
We look at patient’s and physician’s behavior and their impact on health and health care de-
mand. Therefore, we develop testable hypotheses about their behavior and estimate a model 
including patient’s health-related behavior. 
Based on the results of a Cooper-Ross like double moral hazard model, we formulate hy-
potheses to test the physician-patient relationship. Data basis is the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP), a representative longitudinal study of private households in Germany. We 
use both cross-section and panel data. Dependent variables are the probability of a physician 
visit and an index of patient’s health related behavior. We estimate a bivariate probit model to 
include the simultaneous decision of “compliance” and physician consultation. Moreover, a 
recursive bivariate probit model is estimated. Here, we are interested in estimating the direct 
impact of patient’s compliance on the probability of a physician consultation. The set of inde-
pendent variables includes predisposing and socio-economic variables as well as variables 
concerning health status, type of health insurance and living conditions. 
Estimation results support the hypotheses that physician consultation and health-relevant be-
havior are not stochastically independent. This means that health care demand is basically 
determined by the patient and not by the physician. In the recursive bivariate probit model, 
the patient’s health-relevant behavior has a significant positive influence on the probability of 
a physician visit. 
One conclusion of our empirical findings is that existing literature underestimates the pa-
tient’s role in the health care market with respect to the demand for physician services. There-
fore, future health policy should concentrate more on the patient’s needs and behavior. A ba-
  20sic instrument for health care reforms could be to focus on incentives controlling the patient’s 
health care behavior. Moreover, the results support the attempt to encourage patient’s preven-
tive activities. Therefore, it is necessary for the patient to be integrated into the medical treat-
ment chain. This means that the physician-patient communication should be enhanced and 
that the physician’s gatekeeper position should be strengthened. 
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